# **Collective Representation in Congress**

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#### Abstract

The aspiration of representative democracy is that the legislature will make decisions that reflect what the majority of people want. The US Constitution, however, created a Congress with both majoritarian and counter-majoritarian forces. We study public opinion on 103 important issues on the congressional agenda from 2006 to 2022 using the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Congress made decisions that aligned with what the majority wanted on 55 percent of these issues. Analysis of each issue further reveals the circumstances when Congress represents the majority and the many ways that representation fails. The likelihood that the House passes a bill is usually a reflection of public support for that policy, but the ultimate fate of bills depends on partisan control of the two chambers of Congress and the degree of divisiveness between the two party bases in the public. Legislative institutions make it difficult to pass popular issues, but even more difficult to pass unpopular ones. As a result, most representational failure occurs because Congress failed to pass a popular bill rather than because Congress passed a bill that the public did not want.

## INTRODUCTION

The Constitution of the United States created one of the world's first true representative democracies: a system of government in which the national Congress is to reflect the will of the people. Generations of political scientists have debated how well Congress approximates this ideal. Critics of the Congress today list any number of maladies that allegedly prevent the institution from representing the popular will: malapportionment and gerrymandering, voter ignorance, veto politics, polarization, interest groups, economic inequality, and the tendency of parties to focus on their electoral base rather than appeal to the wider public.<sup>1</sup> These forces reputedly prevent Congress from representing the public will.

Through all the laments about Congress, almost no scholarship has taken on the basic empirical question: How often does Congress make decisions that a majority of people support? Empirical research on representation begins with Warren Miller and Donald Stokes (1963), who studied the association between the views of individual representatives and their constituents, or dyadic representation. In his critique of Miller and Stokes, Weissberg (1978) suggested that the collective decision of Congress could be in line with the nation, even if each legislator does not represent their constituents dyadically. Monroe (1979) offered an early attempt to connect national support of specific issues to the passage of legislation. But in the years since Monroe's study, empirical research has shifted away from collective representation and has focused mainly on either dyadic representation (e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Canes-Wrone and Kistner 2022; Clinton 2006; Lax, Phillips, and Zelizer 2019), on the dynamics of opinion change and policy (e.g., Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1983), or on unequal representation by class (e.g., Gilens 2012; Miler 2018). These influential studies and the subsequent literature do not, however, gauge how often Congressional decisions reflect what the majority of people want and under what conditions Congress represents national opinion.

We address these questions directly by drawing on an intensive 20-year survey

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Scholarship on these explanations include Binder (2017), Brady and Volden (2005), Campbell (2016), Gilens and Page (2014), Hacker and Pierson (2020), Krehbiel (1998), Mann and Ornstein (2012), and McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006).

project, the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES; shortened to CES in 2020). The CCES was designed in 2005 with the aim of measuring collective representation and dyadic representation. Each year the CCES surveyed tens of thousands of Americans, and asked, among other topics, their views on five to seven important bills before Congress that year. Over the course of two decades, the study has asked Americans whether they support or oppose 103 key bills on the congressional agenda.

The issues examined here reflect some of the most important issues and decisions that the US Congress faced in the first quarter of the 21st Century. They include national debates over health care, taxes, wages, infrastructure spending, the funding and size of the government, gun control, foreign trade, civil rights of women and LGBTQ, and abortion. These cases also reflect the range of possible outcomes in the legislative process. Most of these bills ultimately received a vote on the floor of the House and the Senate, but some did not because they were blocked by the party leadership, or because they failed in one chamber and were never taken up in the other. They overlap substantially with other classifications of important legislative decisions (Curry and Lee 2020; Mayhew 2011). This set of bills and decisions is certainly atypical of the many thousands of mundane and obscure decisions that Congress makes about the management of government, such as personnel decisions and real estate transactions. Rather, these are important, highly salient issues that often divided our society at the time.

How often did Congress agree with the will of the people on these important decisions? The answer: 55 percent. Successful collective representation occurs when Congress either approves a popular bill or defeats an unpopular one. Representational failure, in this framework, occurs when Congress either rejects a popular bill or passes an unpopular one. Over the past two decades, Congressional decisions aligned with national opinion on 55 percent of these key issues. Likewise, Congress has made legislative decisions that ran contrary to the majority of the public on 46 percent of these set of issues. Because uncontroversial issues are rarely polled and less likely to be revisited by Congress, we also speculate that our quantitative measure of success would appear even *higher* if we could include issues and policies that were not surveyed. Yet, representation is not a tally on a ledger. It is a process through which collective decisions are made about what laws a nation will or will not have. It rests on the election of those who will represent a constituency, and the accountability of those people for the decisions they make. The measure of collective representation helps us understand what that process yields. It also provides a lens on the process itself.

The CCES allows us to analyze further the factors and circumstances that shape collective representation. The electoral institutions, especially the configuration of House and Senate districts, do not account for representational failures. Rather, legislative institutions, especially the bicameral structure of Congress, the parties, and the nature of the issues themselves, are the main obstacles to majority rule. That is especially true when control of government is divided between the two parties or when the public is divided along party lines in its support for a bill. The Constitution of the United States set up the House to reflect popular will, through direct and frequent elections. The Senate, with longer terms and staggered elections was to be more insulated from the public.<sup>2</sup> As we will show, the likelihood that a bill passes the House corresponds to the level of public support for the bill, but the likelihood that the Senate passes a bill is unrelated to public support. The fate of bills in the Senate, and only in the Senate, depends on the division between the parties on the issue: more divisive bills have a much lower likelihood of Senate passage. Moreover, nearly half of the issues under our study fail to receive even a roll call vote in a requisite chamber, and those cases occur overwhelmingly in the Senate.

A closer examination of the legislative histories of the 103 key issues studied by the CCES reveals the variations in context and circumstances that contribute to representational failure. The type of issue, the level of support, unified or divided party control, the degree of party polarization, and the possibility of a filibuster all factor into understanding representational success and failure. For example, foreign relations and legislation designed to address the 2008-2009 economic crisis stand out as examples when Congress passed bills that the nation opposed. Far more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Indirect election of Senators was replaced by direct election in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.

common are when popular bills fail to pass, such as gun control. Some divisive issues pass the Senate, but all such issues since 2009 are when majority parties could circumvent the filibuster or had enough votes to break one. The US legislative process can often frustrate popular rule.

One might hope that on the big decisions, the US Congress would side with the majority of the public more than 55 percent of the time. The US system, however, is more than a simple plebiscite. The Federalists themselves wrote that they created a complex, bicameral system because they wanted to insulate the system from direct popular rule. They created a bicameral legislature that embodied different forms of representation, to provide "a defense of the people against their own temporary errors and delusions" (*Federalist* 63). In this system it is difficult to pass a popular law in Congress. Typically, there must be an alignment of public support, party support, and willingness of both chambers of Congress to move forward. But it is even more difficult to pass an unpopular law. The US system does not give the majority free reign, but it has an even stronger bias against unpopular ideas. That feature of the US system shapes collective representation.

## **MEASURING REPRESENTATION**

We unite two traditions in the study of Congress and representation. One tradition examines how members of Congress make laws. This vein of inquiry includes the large literature that studies legislative veto points and whether legislators can enact their priorities into laws (Binder 1999, 2003; Curry and Lee 2020; Mayhew 1991). These approaches do not have measures of public preferences on specific bills, so there is often no measure of how popular those priorities were.

A second tradition relies on survey data to measure public attitudes. Caughey and Warshaw (2022), Gilens (2012), Gilens and Page (2014), Lax and Phillips (2012), and Stimson (2015) use survey data to study the relationship between mass opinion and policy enactment in Congress (or state legislatures). Some of these studies link public survey data, such as polls conducted by media firms, to policy changes. Others relate trends in national opinion to the trends in laws that Congress passes. These accounts do not investigate how the majority rules or the reasons why

majority rule fails within the legislative institutions, nor do they focus on whether decisions align with majority opinion.

We link specific policy proposals to public opinion on that issue, and trace how the House and Senate dealt with each proposal. This linkage between the survey and the legislative history allows us to measure whether a majority of the public supported the bill, whether the people who identified with each party supported the bill, the support for the bills in each constituency, and the decisions that the legislature made about the bill.

### **Definition of Representational Success**

The core concept in this study is representational success and failure. It is the empirical measure of majority rule. Representational success equals instances in which a majority of people wanted a bill and Congress passed it, plus instances in which a majority of people did not want a bill and Congress rejected it. This notion of representational success various been called "congruence", "substantive representation," or simply "fit" (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Lax and Phillips 2012; Sabl 2015). We revert to Weissberg's original terminology.

Importantly, representational success is not equivalent to passing bills. Success depends on what Congress decides *and* on what people want. If a bill is unpopular, then defeating the bill is a representational success, but passing such a bill would be a representational failure.

Clearly, a success defined in this way is not necessarily a normatively good policy. Popular politics can produce both good and bad policies. We take public opinion to be, as Sabl (2015) put it, "imperfect but presumptively legitimate." Our goal is to show how Congress achieves collective representation, if at all: How the forces of majoritarianism face up to an institutional structure that contains both majoritarian and countermajoritarian components. By using the quantitative measure of success as an organizing concept and by scrutinizing departures from theoretical predictions using legislative case studies, we can highlight the nuances in what congressional representation entails (Sabl 2015, p. 356).

### **Case Selection**

We study the 21st century Congress, from 2006 to 2022. Gilens (2012), Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson (2002), and Mayhew (2011) all end their data collection in 2006. This study starts, in both time and scope, where these studies stopped.

There are good reasons to expect that a new sort of legislative politics set in around 2006. The late 20th century was an era of strong incumbency advantages and party realignments in Congress. The 21st century has seen the rise of party voting in the electorate, polarization between the parties, and strong party leaders, especially Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Mitch McConnell (R-KY), who led their own parties in the House and Senate, respectively, for the entirety of our study period. Their tenures are widely viewed as transformative and partisan.<sup>3</sup> The dynamics of lawmaking and polarization deserve an updated analysis in this modern Congress.

We use the Cooperative Election Study Common Content from 2006 to 2023 to measure public opinion during this time period. Each year's CCES sample is matched to Census demographics and is close to a representative sample of the adult US population. There are approximately 20,000 respondents in each odd year and 60,000 in each even year.

Each year the principal investigators of the CCES selected five to seven of the most salient and important bills under consideration by Congress, based on reporting in *Congressional Quarterly* (CQ) Weekly Reports, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post*, as well as the *Key Votes* selected by CQ, the AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce. CQ defines their *Key Vote* criteria as whether the vote addresses "a matter of major controversy," "a matter of presidential or political power," and "a matter of potentially great impact on the nation and the lives of Americans." In this article we examine the 103 narrower questions about actual policy decisions that Congress faced at the time of each year of the study.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Pelosi's biographer Molly Ball says that as early as 2006, "[Pelosi] was making procedural changes to how the caucus operates to enforce more party unity in order to get the Democrats more unified" (PBS Frontline 2022). Sarah Binder describes McConnell as having "indelibly changed the ways and means of the Senate" and that he "normalized obstruction"; Joshua Huder notes that McConnell and Harry Reid (D-NV) came to power before the Senate was fully enveloped in polarization, but McConnell went on to become "a key architect of the Senate's institutional transformation" (Politico 2024).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The CCES consists of many more issue questions on matters such as abortion, immigration,

Not all of the important bills in a Congress would have come up for a vote in the summer, when the survey questions are written. The CCES is fielded in October through November of each year. Most of the bills chosen in the summer either had already been voted on in at least one chamber, or would eventually be voted on. About 75 percent of our issues are or eventually become identified as CQ *Key Votes*, which is published by CQ after the conclusion of each calendar year. Other scholars use the bills that do receive a vote to study dyadic representation on roll call votes (Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki 2022; Cayton and Dawkins 2022).

Accordingly, most of the 103 bills received a vote in at least one chamber, but a few received a vote in neither and many failed to get a vote in a requisite chamber. The inclusion of issues that never reach the floor is a positive aspect for our research design, as it allows us to see what happened to the issues that never reach the floor. Ignoring these issues can bias our conclusions. It would lose, for instance, the highly unpopular budget bill that House Speaker Paul Ryan pushed through his chamber in 2014. The Senate did not even bother to take a vote on Speaker Ryan's budget. But, that bill was central to the standoff that nearly led the US to default on its debt. We study the Senate's inaction as an outcome in itself.

#### Scope: The Decision Agenda

All studies of representation are shaped by the scope of issues and bills under consideration. Mayhew (1991)'s list of important legislation is a study of passed bills. The discipline's most common measure of Congressional behavior, NOMINATE scores, only uses information from non-unanimous floor votes. Binder (1999)'s gridlock agenda relies on what the editorial board at the *New York Times* decides to comment on. Mayhew (2011) relies on what Presidents declare as their agenda; Curry and Lee (2020) rely on what the Democratic or Republican parties publicly declare as their platform. Survey-based studies like ours rely on what pollsters deem worth asking. Sometimes, policies with quite substantial impacts glide through Congress without becoming controversial on the media or catching the attention of a pollster (Curry, Lee, and Oldham 2024). The selection of issues to be studied can

environment, crime, taxes, and national defense. These questions ask about general issue attitudes rather than bills.

skew the inferences we draw (Barabas 2016).

The 103 key decisions in this study consist of salient issues before Congress on the legislative agenda. Our case selection approximates what Kingdon (1984) calls the *decision agenda*: a small set of issues that are "up for an active decision" (4, 175). This is a small subset of all issues that Congress, as a legislative institution, explicitly considers, which Cobb and Elder (1972) call the institutional agenda.

The decision agenda is not a neutral or random set of issues. It encompasses important problems, such as financial crises and wars, that Congress must respond to. Many of them are "really getting hot" in the media (Kingdon 1984, p. 175). It also reflects the agendas of the two political parties, especially the majority party. Issues are chosen strategically. Legislators introduce bills that are either designed to receive bipartisan and bicameral support (Curry and Lee 2020), or that are designed to take positions on issues to satisfy constituencies (Lee 2016).<sup>5</sup>

The 103 issues on the CCES provide a snapshot of Congress's decision agenda. The issues in this study do not capture the entirety of the decision agenda. That too would be many hundreds of decisions, and beyond the space of the typical survey. Rather, they consist of some of the most salient and important bills considered by the Congress. Most of them made CQ's list of key votes.

Two comparisons provide insight into the nature of these 103 bills. First, how do they compare to the set of all bills on which there was a roll call votes? The NOMINATE scaling procedure estimates a midpoint between the proposal being voted on and the status quo it was proposed to replace. The votes we selected were in fact quite representative of the set of all roll call votes on this dimension (Appendix A).

Second, how do they compare to lists of important legislative decisions based on retrospective studies? We compared the set of bills on the CCES to Mayhew's list of important legislation and Curry and Lee's list of majority priorities (Curry and Lee 2020; Mayhew 1991). There was considerable overlap of the CCES bills with the superset of bills in Mayhew's and Curry and Lee's lists. In fact, we found

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Such position-taking, or messaging bills, are not necessarily omitted from the decision agenda. There is a cost for a representative who only puts failing messaging bills on the agenda (Sulkin 2011).

that the disagreement in our list versus the two other lists was about the same as the disagreement between the Mayhew list and the Curry-Lee list.<sup>6</sup> Mayhew's list does not include bills that never passed (which we capture); Curry and Lee's list does not include priorities that the majority party chose to hide, issues raised by the minority party, Supreme Court nominations, and external events thrust onto the agenda (all of which we capture). Mayhew's list includes several laws of substantive importance that pass without controversy (for which no public polling exists), and Curry and Lee's list includes issues around executive reform, veteran's affairs, and opioids that the are not covered in our 103 issues. These comparisons suggest that the issues in the CCES are fairly representative both of significant legislation and of the thousands of bills on which roll call votes are taken.

Perhaps the biggest concern about bias comes from *non-decisions*: bills, for example, that never make it onto the decision agenda, or issues for which bills were never introduced. As a practical matter, it is difficult to study on non-decisions, as these tend to be non-salient issues about which there is little polling.<sup>7</sup>

We speculate that if there were polls on all issues that Congress faces, the level of collective representation would likely be higher than what we find here. Consider the set of all issues before Congress. First, there are salient, controversial issues. These are well represented in this study. Second, there are non-salient yet widely unpopular issues. The unpopularity of these issues means that no member of Congress or party will likely carry water for these. The lack of decisions makes these representational successes.

Third, there are non-salient, non-controversial, yet popular issues. These are routine parts of Congress such as non-controversial nominations, grants-in-aid, most budget authorizations, and appropriations for member's constituencies (Grimmer 2013; Rosenstiel 2023). Others are issues that Congress has already settled, such as the repeal of Prohibition or requiring food to be sold with standardized nutrition labels. The existing law is popular, and there is no need to take action.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See Appendix A for details.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Burstein (2014) performed a retrospective study. He studied a random sample of 60 bills from all non-appropriation bills introduced in the 101st Congress (1989-1990). He found polling for about 1 in 5 of the specific issues in his sample; the fit of the poll to the bill was not always clear. Burstein comments that this is a time-consuming approach.

Pollsters rarely ask about these issues today because they have become uncontroversial.<sup>8</sup> The lack of legislative action simply continues an already popular policy.

Finally, there are non-salient, yet controversial issues. These are concerns and conflicts that do not rise to the decision agenda. Arnold (1992) argues that such issues may be precisely the ones where narrow interests win over the national interest. Some of these decisions would be popular, and some not. It is unknown how big each of these categories is. Taking these four categories of issues together, though, suggests that lack of a decision may reflect popular opinion far more often than not.

The focus of this analysis, as with most of the research on representation, is on the issues immediately before the Congress, the decision agenda.

### Asking about Bills

The CCES asks survey questions about specific legislative proposals. This helps to minimize measurement error in two ways. First, the survey responses are likely clearer because the issue is unambiguously defined or framed.<sup>9</sup> Second, there is a tighter link between the survey question wording and the content of a specific bill. This is a major difference between roll call questions on the CCES and studies that rely on media polls (Gilens 2012; Monroe 1979; Page and Shapiro 1983). The questions asked by media polls are often not tied to a specific legislative bill and frame the policy in vague or generic terms. The CCES is more closely matched to the actual bills under consideration, and thus permits a stronger connection between preferences and the Congressional decision.

The CCES questions are worded to explain the policy in the bill as concisely and as objectively as possible. For example, the question wording for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) does not mention the Republican party and describes the five types of taxes it will change and by how much. It does not refer to the bill by its name, the TCJA, and simply starts "Would you support or oppose a tax bill that does all of the following?"<sup>10</sup> The questions we use intentionally do not contain explicit

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> We thank Christopher Warshaw for making this point.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Achen (1975). For further elaboration on the value of designing questions tied to actual policy decisions see Gilens (2012, ch. 2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The question states: "A tax bill that would: Cut the Corporate Income Tax rate from 39 percent to

partisan cues. They simply describe the legislation. The questions, including the question wording for each of the issues, are provided in Appendix B. Most of the questions ask for a binary, Yes or No answer. Respondents can skip the question if they wish, but in practice only 1-2 percent do.

Some bills are complex bundles of policies. The TCJA, for example, included tax cuts for corporations, tax cuts for different household and individual earnings brackets, and caps on various tax deductions, such as for state and local taxes. The final bill was an up or down vote on the package. The CCES asked separate questions about corporate tax rates, individual or household tax rates, and limits on deductions, and asked a separate question about the entire package. When we compare how survey-takers respond to yes/no questions on a bundle to how they respond to individual provisions, they behave in much the same way that members of Congress might behave. Some support the package even though they don't support everything in it.<sup>11</sup>

### **Legislative Outcomes**

The final piece of this picture is the outcome in Congress. We consulted the Congressional Record, GovTrack.us, Voteview, and other contemporaneous journalistic coverage to identify if there was a rollcall vote on each of our issues. Because questions are written based on bills in their late or final stage, it is straightforward to match most CCES questions to a bill or a vote. Some cases, especially when legislators change part of a bill late in the process, are judgment calls.<sup>12</sup>

Representation tacitly comes with an assumption about time. Our unit of analysis is a bill (or issue) in each two-year Congress. We assume that legislators rep-

<sup>21</sup> percent, Reduce the mortgage interest deduction from \$1 million to \$500,000, Cap the amount of state and local tax that can be deducted to \$10,000 (currently there is no limit), Increase the standard deduction from \$12,000 to \$25,000. Cuts income tax rates for all income groups by 3 percent." Each provision was displayed as a bullet point.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Support for the individual provisions ranged from 40 percent (a 3 percent tax cut for those earning more than \$500,000) to 80 percent (a 3 percent tax cut for those earning less than \$500,000). Only 12 percent of respondents supported all the provisions individually, but 56 percent of the same respondents supported the overall package to the status quo.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Appendix B and the replication dataset provide the rollcall vote identifier we matched to each issue.

resent their districts now, rather than in the future. We discuss the possibility of representing future electorates later in the article. Some bills come before multiple Congresses, each of these are counted separately. We include both Senate confirmations and treaties. There are 8 such cases.

A further complication in constructing what actually happened in Congress is the increasing use of bundles or omnibus bills (Sinclair 2012). A form of strategic bundling occurs when an unrelated provision is attached to a general bill, or when multiple bills are logrolled into one bill so that it passes. For example, the House majority in 2014 greenlighted the unpopular spending of taxpayer dollars to assist Syrian rebels in fighting ISIS by attaching the provision in the overall appropriations bill. Such ambiguity poses a problem for using roll call votes as a measure of dyadic representation, but it is not a problem for our focus on collective representation. We code whether Congress passes certain pieces of policy through whatever legislative vehicle.

One final issue in tracking legislative outcomes concerns the decisions of other institutions, especially the President and the Supreme Court. Presidents may veto laws or intervene in legislation in other ways. The Supreme Court can overturn laws or make decisions that affect ongoing legislative decisions. Only one of the issues in our dataset was vetoed by the President, the repeal of the Affordable Care Act in 2015. In two other cases, decisions by the executive and judicial branches altered the course of legislation. The Transpacific Partnership in 2016, the largest trade deal the US would have signed, was never ratified in Congress because President Obama did not send the final agreement in time for a vote.<sup>13</sup> In 2014 the Supreme Court decided the *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby*, exempting religious organizations from the contraceptive policies in the Affordable Care Act. That made moot a bill pushed by Senate Republicans that year. Apart from these three examples, the ultimate fate of the legislation lay entirely in the hands of the House and Senate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The Senate did pass the Trade Promotion Authority in the summer of 2015 with much debate, convincing enough Democratic Senators to vote for so-called fast-track authority. As the 2016 election approached, Senators skeptical of the TPP successfully telegraphed to the White House to not force a vote before the election. When Trump won the 2016 election, he quickly withdrew from the negotiations.

### **Summary Statistics**

The key indicators in our analysis are the public support for the items on the decision agenda. These determine representational success and failure. The national support of an issue is simply the proportion of our sample that supports each issue. Figure 1 shows the spread of national support on the vertical axis. Among the most popular issues in our dataset is the proposal to let the government negotiate prescription drug prices (89%) and the bipartisan infrastructure act (82%). Among the least popular is Speaker Ryan's 2014 Budget proposal (19%) and arming ISIS rebels (19%).

The decision agenda tends to be popular. The average issue had the backing of 60% of the public. Seventy percent of our 103 issues had the support of the majority of the public. The tendency for the decision agenda to be popular may be a reflection of frequent elections. The majority party, especially in the House, has just won a national election, controls the agenda, and is incentivized to carry through on its policy platform (Sulkin 2011). We return to this point when we examine collective representation in the House.

Representational success is defined as a simple function of popular support and legislative outcomes. Representational success for issue i is a binary variable, a yes or a no:

where popularity is determined by whether the national support of the issue is above 50%. The mean of this binary variable across all issues is our measure of collective representation.

Our analysis also considers the role of polarization in the electorate. We examine one measure of this phenomenon, the gap between Republican and Democratic partisan identifiers on the issue, which we call *divisiveness*. We define this as the absolute difference between the proportion of Republican-identifying respondents



Figure 1 – Issues by National Support and Divisiveness

*Note*: The divisiveness measure is constructed by the absolute difference between the support among Democratic respondents and Republican respondents. Illustrative issues are labelled. The blue lines show the mathematical bounds of national support if Republicans and Democrats are the same size and the opinion of Independents are at the middle of the two groups.

and Democratic-identifying respondents that support the issue,

$$\text{Divisiveness}_i = |X_i^{\mathsf{R}} - X_i^{\mathsf{D}}|, \qquad (2)$$

where  $X_i^{\text{R}}$  is the proportion of Republican respondents who support the issue and  $X_i^{\text{D}}$  is that among Democrats. Divisiveness ranges from 70 to 80 points, e.g., Impeachment of Donald Trump and Withdrawal from Iraq, to essentially 0, e.g., 1 or 2 percentage points for the 2012 Compromise Tax Bill, the South Korea Free Trade, and the Simpson-Bowles Budget bill. We will call issues *divisive* if this gap between Democrats and Republicans is relatively high (the top 40 percent) and *not divisive* if the gap is low (the bottom 40 percent). This measure of divisiveness is defined at the issue-level and does not depend on there being a roll call vote.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Among those issues for which there is a roll call vote, divisiveness in the public is correlated +0.60 with divisiveness in roll call votes between Republican and Democratic Members of Congress. However, the mass public measure is about 30 percentage points smaller than the floor vote measure.

National support and divisiveness are related. Figure 1 shows the divisiveness of each issue on the horizontal axis. The blue line shows a mathematical limit to the national support of an issue for a given level of divisiveness. Because Republican and Democratic identifiers are equally large and Independent's support almost always lies in between the two groups, divisive issues are never overwhelmingly popular or unpopular with the nation. That is the first indication of the implications of polarization for collective representation.

## **COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATIONAL SUCCESS**

The democratic norm carries with it the expectation that majorities will rule. Against that norm we evaluate each congressional decision.

Figure 2 offers two views of collective representation, a static view and a dynamic one. The static view, shown on the left, pools all of the cases in our sample, ignoring trends or year-to-year variations. The dynamic view, shown on the right, measures the degree of collective representation in all bills in a given Congress (two-year period) using the CCES and Gilens data.

Consider, first, the static view. How often does Congress make decisions in line with the majority of people? The columns in Figure 3 indicate whether the bill passed or did not pass. In our entire sample, 48 percent of the bills pass both chambers. The rows indicate whether a majority of people supported the bill or did not. 71 percent of all bills were supported by a majority of people.

The interior of the table allows us to determine how much collective representation there was. Instances of representational success are along the shaded diagonal. These are cases in which either (i) a majority of people supported the bill and Congress passed it, or (ii) a majority of people opposed the bill and Congress did not pass it (equation (1)). About 38 percent of bills are cases in which a majority was for a bill and it got through both the House and the Senate (case i). Another 17 percent of bills are cases where a majority of people opposed the bill and it died in one or both of the chambers (case ii). Combined, these cases result in a 55 percent rate of successful collective representation.

One concern is that these results are based on survey samples and, naturally,



#### **Figure 2 – Representational Success**

*Note*: In (a), cases include all 103 issues, and "Passed" indicates the passed in both chambers unless the issue is a Senate-only confirmation vote. In (b), gray lines and bars come from Gilens (2012), black lines and bars are our data. The line shows a 4-year running average of representational success, defined as the final legislative outcome being congruent with the majority opinion. Year-averages are centered around the year the question is asked. Histograms show the relative sample size of questions (Gilens) and policies tied to a bill per Congressional session (our data) to indicate the coverage of the sample.

have some sampling error. The sampling error in national support is minuscule, with 95 percent confidence intervals around plus or minus half a percentage point. Even still, we allow for uncertainty in our estimates by replacing the binary distinction of popularity in equation (1) with the majority supports the bill.<sup>15</sup> The intuition is that if the point estimate of public opinion on an issue is a bare majority such as 50.001%, we would like to give it around a 0.50 probability that the majority actually prefers it, rather than a 1. We find that all our subsequent results are robust to this coding.

Now consider, second, the dynamic perspective. We extended our collective representation measure back to 1981, by using data from Gilens (2012). Gilens collected public opinion on actionable policy items from the periods 1981–2002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Specifically, we replace  $\mathbf{1}(X_i > 0.5)$  with  $\Pr(S_i > 0.5)$  where  $S_i$  is the true support for issue *i*. Let *x* be the survey estimate from *n* observations. The Central Limit Theorem implies that  $\Pr(S_i > 0.5 | X_i = x) = 1 - \Phi((0.5 - S_i)/\sigma_i)$ , where  $\Phi()$  is the cumulative density function of the standard Normal distribution. A standard estimator for the uncertainty  $\sigma$  is  $\sqrt{X_i(1 - X_i)/n_i}$ . However, given that Shirani-Mehr et al. (2018) show that the actual error of surveys like the CES tend to be about twice the theoretical sampling error, we provide a more conservative estimate by doubling this number and accounting for weights.

and 2005–2006. Unlike our data, the Gilens data are not linked to Congressional bills so it does not reveal how each chamber dealt with each proposal. However, it does include enough information for us to compute representational success on aggregate.<sup>16</sup> Figure 2b shows the trend in successful collective representation from 1980 to 2022 using the Gilens' data for the first twenty years and CCES data for the second twenty years. Over the past 40 years, representational success hovered around 40 to 60 percent. If anything, the measure was higher in the 2000s than it was in the 1980s.

## THE SENATE AS GATEKEEPER

For a popular bill to become a representational success, it must pass in not one chamber but in two, the House and the Senate. Defeat can come at many different junctures in the legislative process, but the Senate is often thought to be the larger obstacle to collective representation.

That indeed appears to be the case. In Figure 3, we decompose the previous figure by evaluating passage rates in each chamber evaluated against national support.<sup>17</sup> Consider the House, shown in the left panel. There are 69 issues that are supported by a majority of the nation. The House passed 60 (87 percent) of these. There are 26 bills in the data that the nation opposed, and the House rejected 13 (50 percent) of these. Combining these forms of representational success, the House made decisions that agreed with the majority of people on 73 of 95 bills that both chambers could have considered. In other words, successful collective representation occurred on 77 percent of these bills.

This number is quite remarkable. Lengthy literatures describe the institutional impediments to collective representation, including the committee vetoes, party agenda control, and gerrymandering of districts. Even still, the House makes the align with the national majority 77 percent of the time on our measure. This is not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Monroe (1998) studied a similar sample of questions from 1980–1993 and finds a similar number for representational success: 55 percent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> The same set of cases is compared across the two tables. Issues where the Senate has sole jurisdiction (e.g., Supreme Court nominees) are excluded from this table for comparability. Including those issues in the Senate table only changes the cell proportions by at most 2 percentage points.



#### **Figure 3 – Differences in Representational Success by Chamber**

*Note*: See Figure 2. This figure limits the analysis to 95 issues which require both House and Senate approval.

to say that the scholars of committees and parties are wrong. Rather, they may have missed the important incentive that political leaders face. As Mayhew famously argued, the institutions of the House are created with electoral aims. Individual legislators want to remain in power, so too does the majority party. A reasonable strategy for the leadership of the majority party is to manage the congressional agenda to consist of bills that the party wants and that a majority of people want.

The Senate, shown in the right panel of Figure 3, offers quite a different picture. Of the 69 bills supported by a majority of the nation, the Senate only passed 37 (or 54 percent). The House, by contrast, passed 60 (87 percent) of these same bills. The Senate, then, is a major obstacle to passing popular legislation. The Senate does block unpopular bills. Of the 26 bills opposed by the majority of the public, the Senate rejected 17 (65 percent). Combining these two forms of representational success, the Senate succeeded in making decisions that aligned with the public only 57 percent of the time.

To see the bicameral nature of the legislative process more clearly, in Table 1 we classify our issues based on the *joint* actions of the House and Senate. For each chamber, we show whether a floor vote was held, and if it was held, whether it passed. In this new table, we see exactly how much of the difference in passage rates is due to bills not reaching the floor and how the two chambers jointly act on a given bill.

			Senate		
	Success / Policies	No Vote	Vote Held but did not Pass	Passed	Total
	No Vote	5/8	4/6	1/2	10/16
use	Held but did not Pass	2/4	1/1	0/1	3/6
$\mathbf{H_0}$	Passed	3/22	2/8	35/43	39/73
	No jurisdiction	0/1	- '	4/7	4/8
	Total	10/35	7/15	40/53	57/103

Table 1 – Success by House and Senate Action

*Note*: Cells are of the format "m/n", to indicate that there were n bills in that cell and m of them were representational successes. Only issues where both chambers had jurisdiction are included (i.e., we exclude Senate confirmations). The two most prominent cases are highlighted.

Two-thirds of our cases fall into only two of the cells. In the most populated cell (bottom-right), 43 issues pass both chambers, 35 of which are in line with the national majority. In the second most populated cell, 22 issues pass the House but never get a vote in the Senate. Sometimes, the Senate passes laws that the House vetoes, but this happens much less often. Three of the 22 Senate inactions are representational successes in which the House sends an unpopular bill to the Senate, and the Senate rejects it. Far more commonly, Senate inaction leads to representational failure. Overall, nearly half of the issues we see do not pass because of a lack of a recorded vote (16 + 35 - 8 = 43).<sup>18</sup> The prevalence of such inaction by the Senate has nontrivial methodological implications. Past work that relies on floor-based measures such as NOMINATE would miss all of these votes.

How can we account for Senate inaction? That is, what predicts whether the House says yes and the Senate says no? A natural suspect is the Senate's own supermajority requirements. Senate leaders squeeze dozens of votes into precious

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The list of salient issues from the *New York Times*, annotated with legislative success by Sarah Binder (2003) and not dependent on the availability of surveys, shows lower rates of chamber disagreement overall, but similar lopsidedness of the Senate: During the same period, about 9 percent pass the House but get no vote in the Senate, while only 1 percent get a vote in the Senate but not in the House (n = 331).

floor time by an internal device called unanimous consent agreements, but a single rank-and-file Senator can threaten to block that procedure. And forty Senators can sustain a filibuster on most legislation. These two internal rules means that in practice, votes of both parties' Senators are needed to pass legislation in the Senate. Only in the Senate does the majority find such push-back difficult to surmount (Smith 2014).

We estimated a regression predicting an issue falling into that outcome. Specifically, we estimated a linear probability model with time-clustered standard errors of the form:

$$Z_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1(X_i^*) + \beta_2(\text{Divisiveness}_i^*) + \beta_3(\text{Divided Congress}_{t[i]}) + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where  $Z_i = 1$  if issue *i* is both passed in the House and not passed in the Senate (and 0 otherwise),  $X_i$  is the national support of the issue, Divisiveness follows equation (2), Divided Congress is an indicator for whether the House and Senate in congressional session *t* are held by different parties, and an asterisk indicates the standardization to zero mean and unit variance for ease of interpretation. We expect that popular issues will be passed by the House, that issues with a high divisiveness will languish in the Senate, and that the two chambers will reach different conclusions when different parties hold a majority.

We find results consistent with these expectations. See Table 2. In a unified Congress, the House says yes and the Senate says no 23 percent of the time (column 1). A one-standard deviation increase in an issue's national support is associated with a 14-point increase in that event, and a one-standard-deviation increase in divisiveness increases the likelihood by a similar number (column 3). Divided Congress, national support, and divisiveness explain about 20 percent of the total variation. Popular and divisive issues proposed under a divided government are the most likely type of issues to languish in the Senate.

Three findings thus far merit emphasis. First, in 55 percent of the issues studied, Congress did what a majority of people wanted it to do. That is the rate of collective representation in the contemporary Congress. Analysis of the 1980-2022 policies from Gilens (2012) shows similar levels of representation despite differences in

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	0.23	0.22	0.20
	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.083)
Divided Congress (1/0)	0.26	0.29	0.33
	(0.189)	(0.159)	(0.137)
National Support (Z-score)		0.11	0.14
		(0.041)	(0.049)
Divisiveness (Z-score)			0.14
			(0.035)
n	95	95	95
$R^2$	0.070	0.124	0.206

Table 2 – Issues that Pass in the House and Fail in the Senate

*Note*: Outcome is 1 if the bill passed the House and died in the Senate; 0 otherwise. Each column is an OLS regression with standard errors clustered by congress shown in parentheses.

scope. Second, the Senate appears to be the larger obstacle to majority rule in the Congress. The Senate only aligns with majority opinion on 55 percent of our decision agenda, and the Senate's defeat of popular legislation accounts for most of the misalignment between the House and Senate. Third, one correlate of Senate inaction is the partisan divisiveness of the issue, as measured by where the party bases stand. However, this quantitative regression only explains a fraction of the total variation in representational success.

## **POPULARITY AND DIVISIVENESS, AND THE FATE OF BILLS**

Clearly, popularity and divisiveness predict what bills tend to get through the House and the Senate. The exact conditions, though, are nuanced. To see this, consider four different circumstances, based on whether a bill is popular and whether it is divisive in the public.

We divided our issues into four categories — popular and divisive, unpopular and divisive, unpopular and not divisive, and popular and not divisive.<sup>19</sup> Figure 4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> We narrowed our sample in three ways: (1) drop issues whose national support was close enough to 50-50 that the posterior probability of the true value being strictly less than or more than 50 percent was less than 0.99 following note, (2) drop the middle quintile of divisiveness measure, leaving only the issues with values in the bottom 40 percent of the data (not divisive) or the top 40



Figure 4 – Popularity, Divisiveness, and Passage.

*Note*: Issues that have border-line levels of support and the middle quintile of divisiveness are excluded.

reproduces Figure 1 but colors them by this 2-by-2 classification, and also marks each issue by their ultimate passage.

Three out of the four quadrants have passage rates that are quite similar to each other. The regression model in our previous section predicts that issues that are both popular and not divisive will become representational successes, but this top-left quadrant has a 45 percent failure rate. Similarly, our quantitative would predict popular and divisive issues would fail, but these actually pass more than half the time. This led us to examine the legislative histories of each quadrant more closely. We start by popular and divisive issues, and proceed clockwise.

### **Popular and Divisive Issues**

Among the 25 issues that are popular and divisive (top-right quadrant of Figure 4), more than half of them pass and thus become representational success. What explains the unexpected degree of passage in this subset of issues?

An examination of the bills in the data reveals that all of the unexpected results boil down to one of three ways in which Congress can, at times, bypass the Senate's

percent (divisive), and (3) drop Senate judicial and executive nominations. This leaves 73 issues.

supermajority requirement. Table 3 separates these popular and divisive issues by their ultimate outcome: failure (i.e., no passage) on the left column and unexpected success (i.e., passage) on the right column. An explanatory note accompanies the entries in the right column.

All of the counter-expectation results after 2011 are due to special exceptions to the filibuster, known as budget reconciliation. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 stipulated that debate on bills to meet final budget resolutions are only granted limited time for debate on the floor and are not subject to a Senate filibuster. Budget reconciliation can only be used sparingly because they must be tied to a budget resolution.<sup>20</sup> Using this route, the Tax Cuts Jobs Act (2017), supported by 58 percent of the public (but only supported by 38 percent of Democratic respondents), passed the Senate over the objection of all 48 Democratic Senators. A Democratic Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act over the objection of all 50 Republicans in 2022, again under budget reconciliation. Negotiations over what goes into reconciliation are a major part of Senate politics (Reynolds 2017; Valelly 2016). Intraparty disagreements can still doom such attempts.

The second time the Senate passed divisive bills was during the 111th Congress, when Democrats had a filibuster-proof majority for some time. The six most popular issues under this Congress were all divisive. However, Senate Democrats managed to pass all but one of these issues, largely because they secured 60 seats mid-session, from June 2009 when Al Franken (D-MN) was seated until January 2010 when Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat. The signature example of this was the Affordable Care Act. There were exceptions: Senate Democrats could not pass the Cap and Trade environmental bill that passed by the House, due to internal objections within the conference. They also passed at least three major bills with just enough Republican Senators to reach 60 votes.<sup>21</sup> In this short window, the majority prevailed in this Congress largely because they had enough members to overcome

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> See Congressional Research Services (2016). Republicans used reconciliation twice in 2017 by touching on budget resolutions for the current fiscal year and the next fiscal year.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The financial rescue bill (ARRA) in February 2009, before Franken's confirmation, passed with 3 Republican votes. Once Democrats lost their 60th seat in 2010, they relied on two Republicans: Scott Brown (R-MA) and Susan Collins (R-ME) to pass Dodd-Frank by 60-39. The repeal of DADT received eight Republican votes, including from Brown and Collins (Valelly 2016).

Failures (Did Not Pass)	)	Successes (Passed)			
	Supp.		Supp.	Explanation	
109-110th Congress (Bush)					
Withdraw Iraq 2006	0.64	Fund Stem Cell 2005	0.68	Bush compromise	
Withdraw Iraq 2007	0.62	Fund Stem Cell 2007	0.66	Bush compromise	
		SCHIP 2007	0.71	Bush compromise	
		Ban Late Abortion 2006	0.59	Dem compromise	
		Foreclosure Assistance	0.55	GOP compromise	
111th Congress (Obama, 200	<b>)9-2010</b> )				
Cap and Trade	0.60	PPACA	0.55	60 Dem Senators	
-		Dodd Frank	0.71	59 Dem Senators	
		End DADT	0.66	59 Dem Senators	
		Hate Crime Prevention	0.63	60 Dem Senators	
		ARRA	0.53	60 Dem Senators	
112-116th Congress (2011-20	<b>)20</b> )				
Repeal ACA 2013	0.55	Tax Cut Jobs Act (2017)	0.58	Budget reconciliation	
Raise Minimum Wage 2016	0.69	Repeal ACA 2015*	0.57	Budget reconciliation	
Keystone 2014	0.59				
Withhold Sanctuary Funding	0.52				
Raise Minimum Wage 2019	0.65				
117th Congresses (Biden, 2021-2023)					
Build Back Better Act	0.62	Inflation Reduction Act	0.66	Budget reconciliation	
Jan 6th Commission	0.59	ARPA 0.5		Budget reconciliation	
John Lewis VRA	0.70			2	
		Total S	uccess	0.56	

## Table 3 – The Fate of Popular and Divisive Issues.

*Note*: Issues are divided by Congress, and then into those did not pass (left) and those that did pass (right). The Supp column indicates national support. \*One issue, the ACA repeal in 2015, was passed in Congress but promptly vetoed by President Obama.

the filibuster.

The third time the Senate passed divisive bills was during George Bush's second term. He compromised on Republican priorities, including the Democrat-backed funding of stem cell research that angered pro-life Republicans (but was popular overall), and an expansion of the State Children's Insurance Program (also popular overall). The bipartisan maneuvering by Bush is consistent with the analysis in Gilens (2012, Ch. 7), which found that Bush's tenure was one of the high points of representational success in his timespan.

These exceptions, then, effectively prove the rule: the Senate filibuster is a major barrier to majority rule. The 111th Congress under Obama's first term is the only time since 1976 that a single party held a filibuster-proof majority, and that is precisely the high point of representational success in Figure 2b. The only other way popular and divisive issues got through the Senate in the post-Bush era was through skirting the filibuster from a carve-out.

#### **Unpopular and Divisive Issues**

The Senate is a formidable roadblock for popular issues, but the same conservative tendencies of its rules can facilitate representation when the issue is unpopular. Ten issues in our dataset were highly divisive but were opposed by the majority of the nation as a whole, due to tepid support by independents and opposition party members. Table 4 enumerates each one in chronological order.

One striking commonality in these unpopular and divisive issues is that they are all Republican-led. This is likely not a coincidence or an artifact of biased question wording. Hacker and Pierson (2020) demonstrate that the issues in the Republican party agenda during this time were relatively unpopular. Yet, they enjoyed majority support among Republican voters when Republicans held a majority in at least one chamber.

Nine of these ten divisive and unpopular issues failed to pass and are thus counted as representational successes. In all of these cases, either the Senate refused to take up the bill (as in the move to repeal the ACA in 2012) or it voted the bill down (as in the repeal of the ACA in 2017). The one time the Senate let an unpopular policy pass was when budget reconciliation was invoked. In 2006,

Congress		Supp	Deccerco	Exploration
(House/Senate)		Supp.	Passage	Explanation
109 (R / R)	Cut Capital Gains Tax	0.48	$\checkmark$	Budget reconciliation
110 (R / R)	Ban Gay Marriage	0.46		
112 (R / D)	Repeal ACA 2012	0.44		
	Religious Exemption ACA	0.38		
113 (R / D)	Student Success	0.48		
	Religious Exemption ACA	0.43		
115 (R / R)	Repeal ACA 2017	0.48		
	End Visa Lottery	0.44		
	Concealed Carry	0.37		
116 (D / R)	End Taxpayer Abortion	0.47		
	Total	0.90		

Table 4 – The Fate of Unpopular and Divisive Issues.

*Note*: Congress column lists the party control of the House, then Senate. Supp indicates national support.

Republicans passed a cut to the capital gains tax (supported by 48 percent of the public) with budget reconciliation over the objection of 40 Democratic Senators. This is the one time in our data when budget reconciliation was used to pass an unpopular policy. The Senate's aversion to divisive bills acts as a double-edged sword. It blocks popular bills (representational failure) but also blocks unpopular ones (representational success).

### **Unpopular and Not Divisive Issues**

Turning clockwise on Figure 4, we examine issues that are both unpopular and not divisive. These are issues that both party bases do not like. It includes 10 issues covering free trade, tax cuts, budget expenditures (Table 5). The *ex ante* prediction here is unclear. We expect the House to vote down unpopular bills, but the lack of a partisan divide means that it is less controversial to pass in the Senate.

The representational success rate of these unpopular and not divisive issues is a coin toss: 50 percent. That is, both chambers of Congress passed half of these unpopular issues anyways: a free trade deal, committing US military abroad to the Middle East, assistance to Wall Street executives in 2008 to stop a financial meltdown, and a bipartisan budget logroll in Trump's first term that would have added

Congress (House/Senate)		Supp.	Passage	Explanation
(110 436/ 5 611406)		supp.	1 ussuge	Empranation
109 (R / R)	CAFTA	0.35	$\checkmark$	Trade
110 (D / D)	TARP	0.28	$\checkmark$	Crisis
	Extend NAFTA	0.49	$\checkmark$	Trade
112 (R / D)	Extend All Bush Cuts	0.25		
	Ryan Budget	0.22		
113 (R / D)	Sales Tax Online	0.44		
114 (R / R)	Renew Patriot Act	0.45		
	Arm ISIS Rebels	0.19	$\checkmark$	Security
115 (R / R)	Bipartisan Spending	0.36	$\checkmark$	Spending and debt
	Immigration Ryan	0.35		
	Total	Success	0.50	

Table 5 – The Fate of Unpopular and Not Divisive Issues

*Note*: Congress column lists the party control of the House, then Senate. Supp indicates national support.

\$120 billion to the budget. And in the other half of cases, one or both chambers of Congress blocked the bill. It does appear that many of the issues in this quadrant are issues of diplomacy, war, and crisis – a theme we return to.

### **Popular and Not Divisive Issues**

The final quadrant, popular and not divisive issues, should be the easiest path to representational success. These are issues that both Democratic and Republican voters prefer to the status quo.

Some of these issues sail through after committee deliberation: the Violence against Women's Act and Sanctions against Iran are prominent examples. Two of the Biden administration's most explicitly bipartisan bills also fall into this category: the 2021 infrastructure bill and the modest gun control bill in 2022 following the Uvalde school shooting. However, 56 percent is not much better than a cointoss.

One contextual factor that clearly correlates with success in this subset of popular and not divisive issues is simply whether the control of the two chambers is divided. Table 6 takes these 27 issues and shows the representational success rate between the congresses where the same party held the majority in both chambers

	<b>Unified Congress</b>	<b>Divided Congress</b>	
Success	0.67	0.42	
Denominator	n = 15	n = 12	
Congresses	114th (R), 115th (R), 117th (D)	112th (D Senate), 113th (D Senate), 116th (R Senate)	
Example Failures	Big Tech Antitrust, Paycheck Fairness Act	Gun Background Check 2018, Negotiate Rx Costs	
Total Success: 0.56			

#### Table 6 – The Fate of Popular and Not Divisive Issues

vs. those where Republicans and Democrats held different majorities. Close to 2 in 3 of these issues in unified Congresses became a representational success, whereas only 4 in 10 of those in divided Congresses became a success. Divided government has more explanatory power than other potential explanations. This finding is consistent with Binder (1999)'s analysis of Congressional enactments during 1953-1996.

There were two phases of a divided Congress in our timespan. First, from 2011 to 2014, Democrats held the Senate (and the White House) and Republicans held a majority in the House. Democrats in the Senate routinely blocked bills passed by the Republican House including the Keystone pipeline and banning late abortion. Republicans won unified control of the House and Senate in the 2014 election.

Second, from 2019 to 2021, Democrats held the House and Republicans controlled the Senate and the White House. This Congress was the only time in which Pelosi and McConnell were simultaneously leaders of the majority. Ten bills in the CCES were supported by the majority of Americans at this time. Several of the Democrat-led issues that came from the House this session were popular with Republican voters. Bills to require a background check for purchasing a gun, to allow negotiation of prescription drug prices, and to mandate equal pay for men and women were supported by over 90 percent of Democratic voters *and* 80 percent of Republican voters. The other bills coming from the House during this time were polarizing. Regardless of their level of divisiveness, nine of the ten issues passed the House but died in the Senate, including President Trump's first impeachment. The exception was the CARES Act, a response to the COVID crisis in March 2020, which passed the House and Senate overwhelmingly.

Issues that are popular and do not divide the parties do rise to the agenda for one reason or another, but divided government treats them differently. A situation of dueling chambers led by different majority parties is generally bad news for representational success for such seemingly uncontroversial issues.

## **REASONS FOR COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION FAILURE**

The literature on representation offers many reasons why collective representation could fail. We examine three important hypotheses here.

#### **Senate Malapportionment**

Perhaps the most widely noted electoral obstacle to representation is the malapportionment of the Senate. Dahl (2003) identified the Senate as one of our least democratic institutions. That criticism remains relevant today (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2023). Members of Congress see national opinion filtered through the lenses of their own electoral constituencies. The unequal representation of state populations in the Senate might skew legislative decisions in the direction of whichever party or ideology is disproportionately concentrated in smaller states.

We test this claim by measuring how states aggregate national opinion. For each bill, we computed the national support for each issue and the proportion of states in which the majority of a state's constituents support the issue.<sup>22</sup> The relationship between these, shown in Figure 5, is the *seats-votes curve*, but for issues. We provide a summary of this methodology in Appendix A and further explore issue aggregation in congressional districts as well as states in Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki (2024).

Issues that are popular nationally almost always have the backing of a majority

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Let k = 1, ..., 50 index states and  $X_{ik}$  be the estimated proportion of constituents in state k supporting issue *i*. The y-axis of Figure 5 plots  $s_i = \frac{1}{50} \sum_{k=1}^{50} \Pr(X_{ik} > 0.5)$  where the probability is computed following note.



Figure 5 – The Limited Consequence of Senate Malapportionment

*Note*: Each circle is a issue. The black triangle represents the popular vote and states won by Hilary Clinton in 2016, for comparison.

of states. Similarly, issues that are unpopular nationally almost always lack such support. Another feature of this seats-votes curve for issues is that it is highly majoritarian. Whichever side has the most support nationally (in favor or against the bill) is magnified by the states, as shown by the steep slope in Figure 5. In this respect, we find weak evidence that the electoral system itself aggregates people's issue preferences in a way that biases the Senate away from national majorities.

The aggregation of issues is distinct from the aggregation of partisan election results. The triangle in Figure 5 represents the equivalent seats and votes the 2016 Presidential election, in which Hilary Clinton won 51% of the two-party popular vote but won majorities in only 40% of the fifty states. There is bias against Democrats in the electoral seats-votes curve of several percentage points that might create an indirect distortion, by favoring one party over the other (Mayhew 2011). However, small states must have sufficiently different public opinion than large states for malapportionment to distort collective representation, and our findings suggest that such differences are relatively small.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> There is some evidence that highly divisive issues that are correlated with partisanship exhibit a similar bias as election results.

This finding complicates the common way political scientists have assessed the representational harms of Senate malapportionment. The malapportionment hypothesis is that the decisions the Senate reaches would be different if the Senate represented population rather than states. The seats-votes curve indicates that may not be the case.

The vote to confirm Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court gives an illustrative example. See Table 7. Other analyses of this case argue this was a consequence of malapportionment (Johnson and Miller 2023). The usual method for such analyses is to weight each Senator's vote according to state population (Eidelson 2013; Evans 2024; Johnson and Miller 2023). On this vote, 51 out of 100 Senators voted yes, even though their states collectively represented only 44 percent of the country. However, in this example, the states actually magnifies the public opposition to Kavanaugh from 53 percent against to 60 percent against. The problem with the usual approach is that weighting Senator's votes conflates the preferences of the population in the states with the actions of the Senators. Weighting *public opinion* by their voting power shows no incongruence between the opinion of states and the opinion of the nation. Rather, the violations of representation are at the dyadic level. Sixteen Senators, many from large states, voted against their constituents.

Malapportionment does have distortionary effects in the legislature, elevating the power of small Senators in congressional logrolling (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999). However, its effect on representational success is not as obvious.

### **Domestic vs. Foreign Policy**

A second important claim about the context within which collective representation succeeds and fails is that the nature of the issue matters. In their classic study, Miller and Stokes (1963) compared civil rights, domestic economic policy, and foreign affairs, finding that the degree of dyadic representation between representatives and their voters was the highest for civil rights and the lowest for foreign affairs. Subsequent work has focused on this distinction since. We classified issues into foreign, economic, social (e.g., abortion), other domestic, and governmental (e.g., appointments, internal rules). See Table 8.

Foreign policy is, indeed, a domain with high rates of representational failure.

	State's Majo	State's Majority Opinion		
Senator Vote	No	Yes	Sum	
No	44	5*	49	
Yes	$16^{\dagger}$	35	51	
Sum	60	40	100	
	National Ominia	n. 52 managent No.		

#### Table 7 – Malapportionment and Rollcall Voting: The Kavanaugh Vote

National Opinion: 53 percent No

*Note*: An illustrative example of public opinion and roll call votes for the issue of appointing Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court.

\*: Jones (D-AL), Donnelly (D-IN), McCaskill (D-MO), Tester (D-MT), Heitkamp (D-ND)

†: Sullivan (R-AK), Flake (R-AZ), Kyl (R-AZ), Gardner (R-CO), Rubio (R-FL), Perdue (R-GA), Isakson (R-GA), Collins (R-ME), Burr (R-NC), Tillis (R-NC), Heller (R-NV), Portman (R-OH), Toomey (R-PA), Cornyn (R-TX), Cruz (R-TX), Johnson (R-WI)

The important foreign issues on the decision agenda were nationally unpopular. Many of the unpopular and not divisive issues in the previous Table 5 are foreign policy issues and financial or fiscal crises. Nonetheless, many of these bills passed, resulting in a low rate of representational success: 30 percent.

Foreign policy may, however, be the domain in which the trustee model of representation is most active. Considerable expertise and secure information is required to navigate international relations, and Congress often defers to the President, even when doing so runs against their constituents. Foreign policy does help explain a number of representational failures, but it is not a primary explanation of representational failures because only about nine in ten of the issues we study are in domestic policy.

The most common domain is domestic economics. It is the arena of legislation in which one might expect high rates of representational failure, as affluent people are thought to have the disproportionate influence (Gilens and Page 2014; Witko et al. 2021; Bartels 2016; Hacker and Pierson 2020; but also see Brunner, Ross, and Washington 2013; Lax, Phillips, and Zelizer 2019). While a handful of our bills benefit the exclusively wealthy, most others benefit a wide range of interests and

Category	Success	n	Examples
Foreign	30%	10	Normalize Cuba, TPP, South Korea FTA, Arm ISIS Rebels
Governmental	46%	11	Jan 6th Commission, Russia Impeachment, Gorsuch
Social	56%	18	Ledbetter Fair Pay, Violence Against Women, End DADT
Domestic	60%	15	Ban Assault Rifles, Renew Patriot Act, Dream Act
Economic	61%	49	Keystone, PRO Act, Inflation Reduction Act, Repeal ACA

Table 8 – Foreign and Domestic Policy

cannot be coded as clearly benefiting narrow interests or wide interests. The power of narrow financial interests may be best evaluated by studying the agenda setting and logrolling process. Somewhat surprisingly given the literature, economic issues has the highest rate of representational success.

#### **Anticipating Future Opinion**

A third possible explanation for our findings is time. Public opinion about a bill may evolve as people learn about an issue or experience the effects of a law. For their part, politicians may respond to public opinion not only today but in the future (Arnold 1992; Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001). Mansbridge (2003) calls this anticipatory representation. For this argument to explain the deviations from collective representation that we observe it must be the case (i) that opinion shifts considerably over time and (ii) Congressional decisions align more strongly with future opinion than with current opinion.

The CCES does capture the dynamic shifts in the agenda because some issues persist on the decision agenda for multiple Congresses. Raising the minimum wage and the ACA repeal, for example, are each featured four times as separate issues in our data. As an empirical matter, few of the issues polled on the CCES for multiple years exhibit strong overtime shifts in popularity (Appendix A). Hopkins (2023) shows that public opinion on the ACA did not change even after the rollout of the policy's benefits and was rarely moved by experiments that framed the policy one way or the other. This is consistent with other studies of public opinion over time, which show that national opinion tends to be highly stable and shifts only moderately and in predictable ways (Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson 2015). It seems

unlikely, then, that future opinion differs sufficiently and on a large enough number of issues from current opinion to explain most of the failures of representation.

Do congressional decisions align more with future opinion than with contemporary opinion? Answering that question requires a much more complex study than even the CCES can afford. The case of the bill to Repeal the ACA, however, is instructive. Repeal of the ACA was considered in four Congresses from 2011 to 2019. Support for Repeal fluctuated over time. A majority of people opposed it in 2012, and it did not pass in the 112th Congress (a representational success). By 2014, Repeal had gained support nationally and was favored by 55 percent of the public, but Congress did not pass it (a representational failure). Repeal remained popular in the 114th Congress, and the House and Senate passed it (a representational success). President Obama, however, vetoed the repeal bill. Following the 2016 election, with unified Republican control of Congress and the White House, support for repeal finally began to wane (Hopkins 2023). Congress again failed to pass the repeal bill, but by then repeal was unpopular (a success). Based on contemporaneous opinion, there are 3 instances of representational success and 1 instance of failure.

Theories of anticipatory representation rest on assumptions about legislators' time horizon. Congressional scholars usually assume legislators look ahead to the next election (Arnold 1992). On that metric, the rejection of Repeal in the 112th Congress was a representational failure because opinion shifted in the coming year in favor of Repeal. Likewise, the decision to reject the Repeal in the 113th would be considered a representational failure because Repeal remained popular through 2016. And, the passage of Repeal in the 114th Congress would be a representational failure because opinion to Repeal the following Congress. Only the decision to Repeal in the 115th would be considered successful anticipatory representation because in 2017 and years since a majority has opposed Repeal of the ACA. An alternative perspective takes a much longer time horizon. Since 2017, majority opinion has consistently opposed repeal of the ACA. Taking that as the long-run opinion, there are 3 instances of successful representation of future opinion (112, 113, and 115), the same number as with the contemporaneous opinion.

Political scientists are early in the exploration of time and representation. This is clearly a fruitful area for inquiry, but it involves fuller development of the theory and will bring new complications in data collection and research design greater even than those tackled by the CCES.

## CONCLUSION

Collective representation expresses how well Congress, as a collective body, decides on issues where collective decision-making is difficult. It may be impossible for one legislator to represent 400,000 people, Weissberg (1978) conjectured, but it may "be possible for 435 legislators to represent more accurately the opinions of 220,000,000 citizens" (547). Whether they do is an important gauge of how representation works in American democracy. We have offered one of the few systematic empirical studies of collective representation in Congress, and the first such effort to describe the 21st Century Congress.

On 103 key decisions that Congress faced over the past two decades, the House and the Senate sided with the majority on 55 percent of them. To many, the 55 percent figure falls far short of a democratic ideal. One would hope that in a democratic society, the legislative branch would vote with the majority of the public nearly all of the time. Yet, the US Congress aligns with the people on only half of these legislative proposals.

Alternatively, viewed through the lens of the US Constitution, 55 percent seems like quite a strong showing. Separation of powers, bicameralism, and a system of checks and balances make for a legislative process with many points at which a bill can be blocked. Madison and his contemporaries were wary about popularly elected government with short election cycles being captured by a momentary majority. They argued that Congress should be designed not only to reflect the popular will but to be a deliberative body. Those arguments led to a House and a Senate that would encourage a multiplicity of claims to representing the people (Garsten 2010). Any law would have to satisfy a majority of people and a majority of states; it would have to be approved by whatever coalition or party governed the House as well as a different coalition governing the Senate; it would have to go through two different

legislative processes and face scrutiny from different sets of legislators. Issues that can pass all of the hurdles of the legislative process, then, perhaps have a stronger claim to representing the public will.

In fact, that is exactly what happens. Consider the bills that made it through the congressional maze and passed the House and the Senate. With the exception of one Presidential veto, all of these bills became laws. Four in every five -80 percent - of these laws had the support of the majority of the nation (Table 1). The end result of this complicated legislative process, then, is a set of laws that are widely supported by the nation.

This result gives rise to a puzzle. How can 55 percent of the bills be instances of successful collective representation, but the majority of people supports 80 percent of bills that were passed? The answer lies with the bias against unpopular and divisive legislation built into electoral and legislative institutions. In this respect the US Senate serves important, and we think under-appreciated, functions. It blocks bills that are highly divisive. Many of these bills were passed by the House and supported by a majority of the public, so the Senate contributes more to representational failures than the House on our measure. But a bill that is highly divisive can never be overwhelmingly popular (or unpopular).<sup>24</sup> The upper chamber, because it is more insulated from party swings in elections, can serve as a counter-weight to the majority party in the House. The Senate, further, has created internal rules that require the minority party to pass most legislation. As a result, bills that do not have bipartisan appeal face high hurdles. That check is essential when an issue splits the nation along partisan lines or are outright unpopular. The end result is that the laws that Congress does pass tend to be both popular and not divisive.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Recall the funnel-like relationship between national support and divisiveness in Figure 1.

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**Data Availability** Data and code to reproduce the findings in this article are available in Dataverse (Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki 2025).

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## Appendix, "Collective Representation in Congress"

Perspectives on Politics, 2025

Stephen Ansolabehere and Shiro Kuriwaki

## A ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

### A.1 Summary Statistics

Table A.1 summarizes the number of issues in our dataset, along with subgroup averages of national support, divisiveness, and passage.

## A.2 Issue Coverage

One approach to study overlap and generalizability is how representative our issues are of roll call votes generally. To gauge how typical these votes are of the thousands of votes cast by each Congress, we turn to the NOMINATE scalings of all roll call votes currently maintained by Lewis et al. (2024).<sup>25</sup> The NOMINATE scores have been one of the most important innovations in measuring the behavior of individual legislators and characterizing the nature of congressional decision making on legislation. The NOMINATE statistical technique measures an ideal point for each legislator based on the similarity of that legislator's voting record to other legislators, which can be used to map legislators' preferences or ideal points in a common space rather than one decision at a time. The methodology also yields a score for each bill corresponding to the mid-point of all legislators on the bill. If a small set of bills, such as in the CES, are unrepresentative of all roll call votes, then the distribution of the bill mid-points (e.g., mean and variance of the mid-points) will differ markedly from the universe of all roll call votes.

The bills in the CCES on which roll call votes were taken are, in fact, quite representative of the set of all roll call votes. These are summarized in Figure A.1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet (2024). Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database. https://voteview.com/

		Su	rvey	
	n	Avg. Nat'l Supp.	Avg. Divsiv.	Passed
Total Issues	103	.60	.36	.49
(issues needing bicameral approval)	95	.60	.35	.45
Subgroups				
Republican House	61	.55	.33	.44
Democratic House	42	.66	.40	.55
Republican President	44	.60	.40	.45
Democratic President	59	.60	.34	.51
109th (Bush, Hastert, Frist)	8	.55	.46	.50
110th (Bush, Pelosi, Reid)	8	.60	.39	.88
111th (Obama, Pelosi, Reid)	10	.61	.51	.90
112th (Obama, Boehner, Reid)	9	.45	.25	.33
113th (Obama, Boehner, Reid)	14	.53	.31	.36
114th (Obama, Boehner, McConnell)	12	.68	.24	.50
115th (Trump, Ryan, McConnell)	17	.54	.39	.47
116th (Trump, Pelosi, McConnell)	11	.73	.37	.09
117th (Biden, Pelosi, Schumer) Overlap with other lists	14	.67	.37	.50
In Mayhew's Important Legislation	37	.63	.27	
In Curry and Lee's Party Priorities	50	.64	.35	

Table A.1 – Summary Statistics of Issues in Congressional Agenda

*Note*: Average national support is the percent of the nation supporting the issue, averaged across issues. Passage rates indicate the proportion of issues that passed both chambers, or, for issues under Senate only jurisdiction, the Senate. Congresses are listed with the President, House Speaker, and Senate Majority Leader at the time.

On the first dimension of NOMINATE, the average mid-point of the 103 CCES roll call votes is .11 and the variance is .33. The average mid-point of the remaining 15,820 roll call votes .04 and the variance is .31. On the second dimension of NOMINATE, the average mid-point of the 103 CCES roll call votes is .07 and the variance is .55. The average mid-point of the remaining 15,811 roll call votes .07 and the variance is .56. The distribution of mid-points for both the first and second dimensions of NOMINATE are similar for the CCES roll call votes and in the remaining 15,800 roll call votes. To the extent that there is an aberration in the



Figure A.1 – Comparison of Select Bills with All Rollcall Votes

CCES cases, it occurs in the 114th Congress (2015-2017). This was a particularly dysfunctional Congress, in which Republicans shut down the government and John Boehner stepped down as speaker and was replaced by Paul Ryan. In this year, the mid-points of the 7 CCES bills were far to the right of the typical vote. Omitting this year from the data makes the distribution of the first dimension mid-points of the remaining CCES bills even closer to the universe of roll call votes. The mean mid-point on the first dimension becomes .08 for the CES roll calls and .04 for all of roll calls, and the mean mid-points on the second dimension remain .07 for the CES roll calls and .07 for all other roll calls.

A second approach is to compare the lists to those by Mayhew's *Major Legislation* and Curry and Lee's *Party Priorities*. The bottom two rows of Table A.1 and Figure A.2 show the overlap between the two existing lists of issues. The findings and differences between the two lists are described in the main text.





*Note*: Venn diagram with number of cases in each cell. For example, there are 25 issues which are included in all three lists.

#### A.3 A Seats-Votes Curve for Issues

Figure 5 in the main text shows the relationship between seats and votes for issues. The electoral systems literature relies on the seats votes curve on election data to detect bias in the electoral system. Here we use the same logic on survey-based opinions to detect bias in the electoral system in aggregating issue preferences. In other work we introduce this as the *issue aggregation curve*, and replicate the workhorse regression model in the seats-votes literature from a spatial model<sup>26</sup>.

Following this literature, we estimate a regression of seats on votes:

$$\ln\left(\frac{s_i}{1-s_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta \ln\left(\frac{X_i}{1-X_i}\right),\,$$

where  $X_i$  indicates the national support for issue *i* ("votes"), and  $s_i$  is the share of constituencies in which a majority of the public support the issue ("seats"). For example to evaluate the House, let k = 1, ..., 435 index congressional districts, and to evaluate the Senate, we let k = 1, ..., 50 index states. Let  $X_{ik}$  be the estimated proportion of constituents in district *k* supporting issue *i*. Then for our Senate analysis,  $s_i = \frac{1}{50} \sum_{k=1}^{50} \Pr(X_{ik} > 0.5)$ . We estimate the probability according to the central limit theorem and the point estimate, as described in the main text. The regression converts *s* and  $X_i$  into log odds, where ln indicates the natural log, as is customarily done from variables bounded between 0 and 1. In computing the estimates, we dodge the estimates of  $s_i$  slightly, by 0.00001, to avoid dividing by 0.

Our main quantity of interest in this analysis is the value of the intercept  $\alpha$ , which the seats-votes literature refers to as "partisan bias" or "partisan asymmetry." The intercept indicates the seatshare evaluated at  $X_i = 0.5$ , i.e. a nationally tied issue (this is because when  $X_i = 0.5$ ,  $\ln\left(\frac{X_i}{1-X_i}\right) = 0$ ). Intercepts that deviate from 0 indicate that a issue can win a majority of constituents with less than majority of the constituents.

The issue aggregation curve that best fits our survey estimates has the coeffi-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Ansolabehere, Stephen and Shiro Kuriwaki (2024). "Preference Aggregation: A Seats Votes Curve for Issues"

cients:

$$\ln\left(\frac{s_i}{1-s_i}\right) = -0.04 + 6.16\ln\left(\frac{X_i}{1-X_i}\right),$$

The R-squared for these regressions are 0.95, indicating that the data fit the functional form quite well. The intercept is statistically indistinguishable from zero, with a standard error of 0.16. This is also evident in how almost none of the points are in an off-diagonal quadrant. The slope is also very steep, far larger than the conventional cube law of 3.

## A.4 Overtime change in opinion

The CCES sometimes asks the same question for multiple years. Figure A.3 charts the national support for issues where two or more years are available. In the main paper, when there are multiple years, we combine the estimates by weighting each year equally.

We also make several additions to this graph for context. We add more years than we use here on the Repeal of the ACA, which the CCES asked even after the repeal of the individual mandate in 2017.<sup>27</sup> We also added 5 issues from the 2010-2012-2014 panel survey, which holds the sample fixed to the same respondents.<sup>28</sup>



Figure A.3 – Overtime Change in Issue Opinion.

Each connected line indicates the same issue asked over multiple years.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Dagonel, "Cumulative CCES Policy Preferences." Harvard Dataverse, V3, 2023, https://doi. org/10.7910/DVN/OSXDQO

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Ansolabehere and Schaffner, CCES 2010-2014 Panel Study, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ TOE8I1.

## **B** LIST OF ISSUES IN THE DECISION AGENDA

Table B.1 shows question wording of all the issues that comprise our decision agenda. All questions come from the Cooperative Election Study and CES common content. "Nat'l Support" shows the percent of the nation that supports the proposal. In all questions "Don't Know" is either not a response option, or is negligible and removed from the denominator. The percentage is rounded to the nearest percent with one exception: When an issue's support is between 49.5 and 49.999 percent, we display it as "49%" to make clear it does not meet a majority. "Passed" shows the final outcome in the House and Senate. If a vote was taken, each entry is hyperlinked to the corresponding roll call vote on Voteview (www. voteview.com). Question wordings are listed without the overall prompt (of the form, "Congress considered several bills this year. Would you support or oppose the following proposals?"). Questions are ordered by the Congressional session (labeled by President, House Speaker, and Majority Leader) and then by national popularity. Sometimes, the same question about the same bill is asked in adjacent years. We pool responses across years in that case.

<b>Table B.1</b> – '	The I	Decision	Agenda
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				Passed	
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
109th Congre	ss (2005-06, Bush, Hastert, Frist)				
CAFTA	This year Congress also debated a new free trade agreement that reduces barriers to trade between the U.S. and countries in Central America. Some politicians argue that the agreement allows America to better compete in the global economy and would create more stable democracies in Central America. Other politicians argue that it helps businesses to move jobs abroad where labor is cheaper and does not protect American producers.	35%	Y	Y	Y

				Passed	
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Immigration Reform	One plan considered by the Senate would offer illegal immigrants who already live in the U.S. more opportunities to become legal citizens. Some politicians argue that people who have worked hard in jobs that the economy depends should be offered the chance to live here legally. Other politicians argue that the plan is an amnesty that rewards people who have broken the law.	39%	Ν	N (no vote)	Ν
Ban Gay Marriage	Amendment to Ban Gay Marriage. Constitutional Amendment banning Gay Marriage	47%	N	Ν	N
Cut Capital Gains Tax	We'd like to ask about cutting taxes on the money people make from selling investments, also referred to as capital gains. This past year the Senate considered a bill to extend capital gains tax cuts passed in 2001. Some politicians argue that these tax reductions make the economy strong and encourage people to invest more. Others argue that the plan would mostly benefit people who are already rich and that any tax cuts should be shared more fairly among all taxpayers.	48%	Υ	Υ	Υ
Ban Late Abortion 2006	A proposal in Congress to ban a type of late-term abortion sometimes called "partial-birth abortion." Some argue that late-term abortion is a barbaric procedure and should be banned. Others argue that late-term abortions are extremely uncommon and used only in exceptional circumstances best determined by a doctor, not the Congress. The proposed legislation could also be the opening to a broader ban on abortion.	59%	Υ	Υ	Υ

 Table B.1 – The Decision Agenda (continued)

Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Withdraw Iraq 2006	The president begin phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq starting this year and submit to Congress by the end of 2006 a plan with estimated dates for continued phased withdrawal. Some politicians argue that setting out a plan to withdraw would make Iraqis take responsibility for their country and become more independent of the U.S. Others argue that it is too early to start withdrawing, and that doing so would make terrorists grow bolder.	64%	Ν	N (no vote)	Ν
Fund Stem Cell 2005	Whether the federal government should fund stem cell research. Some in Congress argue that this research may lead to cures for diseases and disabilities affecting large numbers of Americans, and should be funded. Others argue that a potential human life has to be destroyed in order to use these cells, and funding it would be unethical.	68%	Υ	Υ	Y
Raise Minimum Wage 2006	Increase the federal minimum wage from \$5.15 to \$6.25 within the next year and a half. Some politicians argue that the wage should be increased because it hasn't changed since 1997 and many workers still live in poverty. Other politicians argue that raising the wage might force small businesses to cut jobs and would hurt the economy.	78%	Ν	Υ	Ν
110th Congr	ess (2007-06, Bush, Pelosi, Reid)				
TARP	Bank Bailout. U.S. Government's \$700 Billion Bank Bailout Plan	28%	Y	Y	Y
Extend NAFTA	Extend NAFTA. Extend the North American Free trade Agreement (NAFTA) to include Peru and Columbia	49%	Y	Y	Y
Foreclosure Assistance	Federal Assistance for Housing Crisis, Federal assistance for homeowners facing foreclosure and large lending institutions at risk of failing	55%	Y	Y	Y

	Question Wording			Passed	
Policy		Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Withdraw Iraq 2007	A proposal to reduce the number of U.S. troops serving in Iraq within 120 days, and would require most troops to be withdrawn by April next year. Some in Congress argue that setting out a plan to withdraw would make Iraqis take responsibility for their country and become more independent of the U.S. Others argue that it is too early to start withdrawing, and that doing so would make terrorists grow bolder.	62%	Ν	Υ	Ν
Fund Stem Cell 2007	Stem Cell Research. Allow federal funding of embryonic stem cell research	66%	Y	Y	Y
FISA	Another bill, the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act, would allow the U.S. government to eavesdrop on foreigners in the United States without having to obtain a warrant from a judge. Supporters argue that these expanded powers are necessary to fight terrorist threats. Others argue that they would violate constitutional privacy rights and that there are not enough checks on this type of surveillance.	67%	Υ	Υ	Υ
SCHIP 2007	Congress voted on a proposal to renew and increase funds for a state-run program called SCHIP that provides health care to children whose families can not afford private insurance. Supporters argue that the bill is needed to cover around 9 million currently uninsured children. Opponents argue that the cost of the program is too high and it will push children who already have private health insurance into a publicly financed health care system.	71%	Y	Y	Υ

			Passed		
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Raise Minimum Wage 2007	A bill before Congress earlier this year proposed to increase the federal minimum wage from \$ 5.15 to \$7.25 within the next year and a half. Supporters argue that the wage should be increased because it hasn't changed since 1997 and many workers still live in poverty. Opponents argue that raising the wage might force small businesses to cut jobs and would hurt the economy.	82%	Υ	Y	Υ
111th Congre	ss (2009-10, Obama, Pelosi, Reid)				
Kagan	Appoint Elena Kagan to the U.S. Supreme Court	49%	Y		Y
Sotomayor	Appoint Sonia Sotomayor to the US Supreme Court	51%	Y		Y
ARRA	American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Authorizes \$787 billion in federal spending to stimulate economic growth in the US.	54%	Y	Y	Y
PPACA	Comprehensive Health Reform Act. Requires all Americans to obtain health insurance. Allows people to keep current provider. Sets up national health insurance option for those without coverage. Paid for with tax increases on those making more than \$280,000 a year.	55%	Y	Y	Y
Cap And Trade	American Clean Energy and Security Act. Imposes a cap on carbon emissions and allow companies to trade allowances for carbon emissions. Funds research on renewable energy.	60%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
Hate Crime Prevention	Federal Law Enforcement Hate Crime Acts. Extends federal hate crime legislation to cover violence against gays and lesbians.	63%	Y	Y	Y
Ledbetter Fair Pay	The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. Allows individuals to sue for pay discrimination at work within 180 days of most recent pay check.	64%	Y	Y	Y

			Passed		
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
End DADT	End Don't Ask, Don't Tell. Would allow gays to serve openly in the armed services	66%	Y	Y	Y
Dodd Frank	Financial Reform Bill. Protects consumers against abusive lending. Regulates high risk investments known as derivatives. Allows government to shut down failing financial institutions.	71%	Y	Y	Y
SCHIP 2009	State Children's Health Insurance Program. Program insures children in low income households. Act would renew the program through 2014 and include 4 million additional children.	74%	Y	Y	Y
112th Congres	ss (2011-12, Obama, Boehner, Reid)				
Ryan Budget	2011 House Budget Plan. The Budget plan would cut Medicare and Medicaid by 42%. Would reduce debt by 16% by 2020.	19%	N	Y	Ν
Extend All Bush Cuts	The Tax Hike Prevention Act. Would extend Bush-era tax cuts for all individuals, regardless of income. Would increase the budget deficit by an estimated \$405 billion.	24%	Ν	N (no vote)	N (no vote)
Religious Exemption ACA 2012	Birth Control Exemption. A Bill to let employers and insurers refuse to cover birth control and other health services that violate their religious beliefs.	37%	N	N (no vote)	Ν
Repeal ACA 2012	Repeal Affordable Care Act. Would repeal the Affordable Care Act.	43%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
Simpson Bowles	Simpson-Bowles Budget Plan. Plan would make 15% cuts across the board in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Defense, as well as other programs. Eliminate many tax breaks for individuals and corporations. Would reduce debt by 21% by 2020.	50%	Ν	Ν	N (no vote)

			Passed		
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senato
Raise Debt Ceiling 2011	This past August Congress passed a bill that raised the DEBT CEILING through 2012. The bill also cut \$2.4 trillion of federal government spending over the next ten years.	50%	Y	Y	Y
South Korea FTA	U.SKorea Free Trade Agreement. Would remove tariffs on imports and exports between South Korea and the U.S.	51%	Y	Y	Y
ATRA	The Middle Class Tax Cut Act. Would extend Bush era tax cuts for incomes below \$200,000. Would increase the budget deficit by an estimated \$250 billion.	60%	Y	Y	Y
Keystone 2012	Keystone Pipeline. A bill to approve the Keystone XL pipeline from Montana to Texas and provide for environmental protection and government oversight.	73%	N	Y	Ν
113th Congre	ess (2013-14, Obama, Boehner, Reid)				
Arm ISIS Rebels	Provide arms to those opposing ISIS	19%	Y	Y	Y
Concealed Carry 2013	Make it easier for people to obtain concealed weapons permits	42%	N	N (no vote)	N (no vote)
Religious Exemption ACA 2014	Birth Control Exemption. A Bill to let employers and insurers refuse to cover birth control and other health services that violate their religious beliefs.	43%	N	N (no vote)	N (no vote)
Sales Tax Online	Marketplace Fairness Act. Would allow states and localities to collect sales taxes on sales made over the Internet, not just on as sales made in stores.	44%	N	N (no vote)	Y
Raise Debt Ceiling 2014	Debt Ceiling. Allow the US government to borrow funds as needed to meet spending obli- gations and avoid default on US government bonds.	45%	Y	Y	Y

			Passed		
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Student Success	Student Success Act. Would end more than 70 federal education programs and decentralize decision-making to state and local government; promotes Charter Schools; eliminates federal intervention in poor performing schools.	48%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
End Nomination Filibuster	Cloture. Would amend Senate rules by decreasing the number of votes (from 60 to 51) required to end debate on judicial and executive nominations	53%	Y		Y
Repeal ACA 2013	Repeal Affordable Care Act. Would repeal the Affordable Care Act.	55%	N	Y	N (no vote)
Keystone 2014	Approve Keystone Pipeline. A bill to approve the Keystone XL pipeline from Montana to Texas.	59%	Ν	Y	Ν
Gun No Disclosure 2013	Prohibit state and local governments from publishing the names and addresses of all gun owners	60%	N	N (no vote)	Y
Farm Bill	Agriculture Bill. Ends price supports for corn, wheat, sugar and other agricultural products. Creates a federally subsidized crop insurance program. Reauthorizes the food stamp program, but cuts 10% of the program's funding.	61%	Y	Y	Y
Ban Assault Rifle 2013	Ban assault rifles	61%	N	N (no vote)	Ν
Ban Late Abortion 2013	Abortion Bill. Would prohibit abortions after the 22nd week of pregnancy.	68%	N	Y	N (no vote)
Violence Against Women	Violence Against Women Act. Would make grants to assist victims of domestic violence and help law enforcement prosecute those cases. Make stalking a crime; strengthen criminal rape statutes.	90%	Y	Y	Y

Policy				Passed	
	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
114th Congre	ss (2015-16, Obama, Boehner/Ryan, McConnell)				
Renew Patriot Act	Renew Patriot Act Phone Surveillance Provisions. Renews the National Security Agency's bulk phone database created under the Patriot Act of 2001	45%	N	N (no vote)	N (no vote)
Garland	Supreme Court Nomination. Approve the nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court of the United States	53%	N		N (no vote)
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership Act. Free trade agreement among 12 Pacific nations (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and the US).	55%	Ν	N (no vote)	N (no vote)
Repeal ACA 2015	Repeal ACA. Would repeal the Affordable Care Act	57%	Y	Y	Y
Medicare Reform	Medicare Accountability and Cost Reform Act. Shifts Medicare from fee-for-service to pay-	67%	Y	Y	Y

## USA Freedom Act. Ends the US government's phone surveillance database program. Allows individual phone companies to keep such databases. Normalization of Relations with Cuba. Allows the US government to renew normal diplomatic relations with Cuba

Ν

Y

Ν

(no

68% N

70% Y

72% N

Ν

Y

Ν

(no

vote)

vote) vote)

(no

for-performance. Ties Medicare payments to doctors

Minimum wage. Raise the federal minimum wage to

to quality of care measures. Requires higher premiums for seniors who make more than \$134,000. Renews the Children Health Insurance

Program (CHIP).

\$12 an hour by 2020.

Raise

2015

Cuba

Minimum

Wage 2016

Normalize

Freedom Act

			Passed		
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Education To States	Education Reform. Repeals the No Child Left Behind Act, which required testing of all students and penalized schools that fell below federal standards. Allows states to identify and improve poor performing schools	78%	Y	Y	Υ
Iran Sanction	Iran Sanctions Act. Imposes new sanctions on Iran, if Iran does not agree to reduce its nuclear program by June 30.	81%	Y	Y	Y
Highway Funding	Highway and Transportation Funding Act. Authorizes \$305 Billion to repair and expand highways, bridges, and transit over the next 5 years.	82%	Y	Y	Y
TAA	Trade Adjustment Assistance Act. Provides education assistance and retraining to workers who have lost their jobs as a result of foreign trade	84%	Ν	N	Y
115th Congre	ss (2017-18, Trump, Ryan, McConnell)				
Immigration Border Wall	Grant legal status to DACA children, spend \$25 billion to build the border wall, and reduce legal immigration by eliminating the visa lottery and ending family-based migration.	35%	Ν	Ν	N (no vote)
Bipartisan Spending	Increase defense spending by \$60 billion. Increase discretionary non-defense spending by \$60 billion. Leave spending on entitlement programs unchanged	36%	Y	Y	Y
Concealed Carry 2018	Make it easier for people to obtain a concealed-carry gun permit	37%	Ν	N (no vote)	N (no vote)

			Passed		
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Weaken Dodd Frank	Financial CHOICE Act. Allows banks to not be subject to the heightened regulatory requirements of Dodd-Frank by maintaining enough reserve funds withstand a financial downturn. Grants the president the power to fire the head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Housing Finance Agency at any time and without cause. Repeals a rule which prevents commercial banks from making speculative investments for their own profits.	42%	Y	Y	Υ
АНСА	American Health Care Act. Would repeal the tax penalties on individuals for not maintaining health coverage and on employers for not offering coverage. Would end subsidies to help people purchase insurance and would end funding for states that expanded Medicaid	43%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
End Visa Lottery	Reduce legal immigration by eliminating the visa lottery and ending family-based migration.	44%	Ν	N	N (no vote)
De Vos	Appointment of Betsy DeVos as Secretary of Education	45%	Y		Y
Kavanaugh	Appoint Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court of the United States.	47%	Y		Y
Repeal ACA 2017	Would repeal the Affordable Care Act	48%	Ν	N (no vote)	Ν
Gorsuch	Confirm Neil Gorsuch to Supreme Court	50%	Y		Y
Withold Sanctuary Funding	No Sanctuary for Criminals Act. Withholds federal funds from states and localities that do not follow federal immigration laws.	52%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)

			Passed		
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Tax Cut Jobs Act	A tax bill that would: • Cut the Corporate Income Tax rate from 39 percent to 21 percent, • Reduce the mortgage interest deduction from \$1 million to \$500,000, • Cap the amount of state and local tax that can be deducted to \$10,000 (currently there is no limit), • Increase the standard deduction from \$12,000 to \$25,000. • Cuts income tax rates for all income groups by 3 percent.	58%	Y	Y	Y
Ban Late Abortion 2018	Ban abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy	66%	Ν	Y	Ν
Continue Funding	Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017. Funds the government through the end of the fiscal year. Increases defense spending and funding for the National Institutes of Health. Includes funding for border security, but funds could not be used for a border wall. Also includes funding for wildfire relief, Puerto Rico's Medicaid program, the National Endowment for the Humanities, Planned Parenthood and healthcare for coal miners	70%	Υ	Υ	Υ
Dream Act	Provide legal status to children of immigrants who are already in the United States and were brought to the United States by their parents. Provide these children the option of citizenship in 10 years if they meet citizenship requirements and commit no crimes. (DACA).	74%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
Russia Sanction	Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Places sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Sets into law sanctions imposed by the Obama administration for Russia's interference in Ukraine, Syria, and the 2016 presidential election. Requires the president to get congressional approval before easing or lifting sanctions on Russia	78%	Υ	Υ	Υ

			Passed		
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Kate's Law	Kate's Law. Increases criminal penalties for individuals in the country illegally who are convicted of certain crimes, deported, and then re-enter the U.S. illegally.	86%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
116th Congre	ss (2019-20, Trump, Pelosi, McConnell)				
End Taxpayer Abortion	Prohibit the expenditure of funds authorized or appropriated by federal law for any abortion.	47%	N	N (no vote)	Ν
Russia Im- peachment Obstruction	Remove President Trump from office for obstruction of Congress	49%	N	Y	Ν
Russia Im- peachment High Crime	Remove President Trump from office for abuse of power	51%	N	Y	Ν
Raise Minimum Wage 2019	Raise the minimum wage to \$15 an hour.	65%	N	Y	N (no vote)
Equality Act 2019	Amend federal laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation.	73%	N	Y	N (no vote)
HEROES	In May, the HEROES ACT proposed to spend an additional \$3 trillion, including \$1 trillion for state and local governments and hospitals, spend \$200 billion in hazard pay for essential workers, and give households an additional \$1,200 to \$6,000.	78%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
Justice in Policing Act	Increase accountability for misconduct by police officers, create a national registry of police officers who have been fired for misconduct, and establish stricter officer training requirements.	83%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)

			Passed		
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Negotiate Prescription Costs	Allow the government to negotiate with drug companies to get a lower price on prescription drugs that would apply to both Medicare and private insurance. Maximum negotiated price could not exceed 120% of the average prices in 6 other countries.	89%	Ν	Υ	N (no vote)
Pay Equity 2019	Require equal pay for women and men who are doing similar jobs and have similar qualifications.	89%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
CARES	In March, the CARES Act proposed to spend \$2 trillion in emergency and health care assistance for individuals, families, and businesses, including up to \$1,200 per individual and \$500 per child.	89%	Y	Y	Y
Gun Background Check 2018	Background checks for all sales, including at gun shows and over the Internet	89%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
117th Congre	ss (2021-22, Biden, Pelosi, Schumer)				
KBJ	Appoint Ketanji Brown Jackson to the U.S. Supreme Court.	52%	Y		Y
ARPA	Authorize spending up to \$1.9 trillion for COVID relief from March 2021 through September 2021, including extension of unemployment benefits through September 2021, and emergency funding to state and local governments for the fiscal year.	58%	Y	Y	Y
Jan 6th Commission	Establish a commission to investigate the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol.	59%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
Women's Health Protection Act	Prohibit government restrictions on the provision of, and access to, abortion services.	61%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)

Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Passed		
			Both	House	e Senate
Build Back Better Act	Spend \$2.2 trillion over the next decade to provide universal prekindergarten, subsidies for child care, expanded financial aid for college, housing support, home and community care for older Americans, and to shift the U.S. economy away from fossil fuels to renewable energy and electric cars.	62%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
Big Tech Antitrust	Prohibit large online platforms from giving preference to their own products on the platform at the expense of competing products from another business.	63%	Ν	N (no vote)	N (no vote)
Respect for Marriage	Require that all federal agencies recognize same-sex marriages and interracial marriages.	63%	Y	Y	Y
CHIPS	Provide \$52 billion in grants for American semiconductor manufacturing and research and a tax credit subsidizing 25% of investments in semiconductor manufacturing.	64%	Y	Y	Y
Inflation Reduction Act	Spend \$369 billion for tax credits to encourage the production of solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries; lowers Affordable Care Act health care premiums; reduces the deficit by \$300 billion by allowing Medicare to negotiate the cost of some prescription drugs and making changes to the tax code.	66%	Υ	Υ	Y
PRO Act	Prohibit employers from firing or replacing workers who participate in a strike; remove prohibition on workers at one company supporting a strike by workers at another company (also known as secondary strikes).	68%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)
John Lewis Voting Act	Require that state and local governments with a history of discrimination in voting must obtain approval of changes in election laws from the Department of Justice.	70%	N	Y	N (no vote)

			Passed		
Policy	Question Wording	Nat'l Supp.	Both	House	e Senate
Bipartisan Infrastruc- ture	Spend \$150 billion a year for 8 years on construction and repair of roads and bridges, rail, public transit, airports, water systems and broadband internet	82%	Y	Y	Y
School Gun Safety	Increase spending on mental health and school safety; allow police to confiscate guns from people deemed to be dangerous by a judge; prohibit people convicted of domestic violence from owning guns; enhance background checks on minors; increase penalties for illegal gun purchases.	85%	Y	Y	Y
Pay Equity 2021	Require equal pay for women and men who are doing similar jobs and have similar qualifications.	86%	Ν	Y	N (no vote)

 Table B.1 – The Decision Agenda (continued)